论雅可比的实在论

On Jacobi’s Realism

受休谟和里德影响,雅可比在其《休谟论信仰,或观念论与实在论,一篇对话》一书中提出了他所谓的实在论观点:信仰是一切知识的基础;一切知识都来源于经验。然而,这一实在论立场如何在与观念论“若即若离”的关系中鲜明地呈现自身并能够有效地批判对方,这一问题值得深入探究。欲解决此问题,需澄清雅可比的信仰概念与实在论立场,分析他倚重“常识”这一概念的原因及其实在论演绎的方式,重估他对康德物自身的批判和保留先验知识这一做法,尤其是其为确立“理性”之真正含义所做出的诸多努力。借此,通过深入考察雅可比对纯粹理性的批判以及其提出的对康德先验观念论予以补充的新方案,可以得知:其实在论其实是一种追问存在与现实但在很多方面近似观念论的实在论形态。

Influenced by Hume and Reed,Jacobi expounded his realism in his book David Hume on Faith,or Idealism and Realism,a Dialogue:faith or belief is the foundation of all knowledge;all knowledge comes from experience.However,how this realist position distinctly presents itself and effectively criticizes the other in its subtle relations with idealism,becomes a topic worthy of inquiry.From this perspective,this paper clarifies Jacobi’concept of faith and his position as a realist,analyzes his dependence on the“common sense”with immediate certainty and his deduction of realism,and reexamines his criticism of Kant and retention of prior knowledge,especially his efforts to explore the true meaning of“reason”.By this,it tries to gain a deep understanding of Jacobi’s critique of pure reason and his proposed alternatives to Kant’s transcendental idealism.It can be found that a realism,which shows concerns for being and reality,but in many ways approximates idealism.