微观视角下国民经济动员潜力隐瞒行为探究

Research on the Concealment of National Economy Mobilization Potential from the Micro Perspective

多年动员实践表明,企业存在国民经济动员潜力隐瞒行为。为此,从微观视角入手,运用经济学中市场均衡的理论及边际分析的方法,通过比较静态分析对企业的决策倾向及行为选择进行探究。研究发现,动员活动会造成企业均衡的变动。相比正常市场条件下的均衡,随着动员物资生产数量的增加,完全竞争市场中企业的生产者剩余和利润会降低,垄断市场中企业的利润会先增加后减少。由于现行动员补偿制度无法弥补企业参与动员活动降低的利润,所以在动员潜力调查阶段企业倾向隐瞒生产能力。基于此,应完善落实合理的征用补偿标准、激励引导企业角色的转变和加强国民经济动员法治化建设,帮助国民经济动员机构消除这种不利于动员活动的企业行为。

Several years of mobilization practice shows that enterprises have the behavior of concealing the national economy mobilization potential.Therefore,this paper focuses on the microscopic perspective and uses the theory of market equilibrium and the method of marginal analysis in economics to analyze the decision-making tendency and behavior choice of firms by comparative static analysis.It is found that mobilization activities will cause a change in firm equilibrium.Compared with the equilibrium under normal market conditions,with the increase of mobilization material production quantity,the producer surplus and profit of enterprises in perfect competition market will decrease,and the profit of enterprises in monopoly market will increase first and then decrease.As the current mobilization compensation system can not make up for the reduced profits of enterprises participating in mobilization activities,they tend to conceal production capacity in the stage of mobilization potential investigation.Based on this,we put forward three suggestions and measures,such as improving the implementation of reasonable expropriation compensation standards,encouraging and guiding the transformation of corporate roles,and strengthen the legalization of national economy mobilization,to help the national economy mobilization agencies to eliminate such corporate behavior that is not conducive to mobilization activities.