债权人保护与公司过度投资——基于债券契约的研究

Creditor Protection and Corporate Over-Investment:Research Based on Bond Covenants

近年来,公司过度投资引发债券违约的现象引起各界的普遍关注,债券契约作为缓解债权人与股东及管理层利益冲突的重要工具,对公司过度投资具有约束效应。本文基于手工搜索的债券契约信息,构建债权人保护指数并深入研究其对公司过度投资的约束效应。研究发现,良好的债权人保护有助于抑制公司过度投资。进一步的检验还显示:在股东持股比例较高、管理层道德风险水平较低、内部控制较差、法律环境薄弱地区及非国有企业中,债权人保护抑制公司过度投资的效果更为显著。

In recent years,the phenomenon of bond default caused by corporate over-investment has attracted widespread attention from all sectors.As an important tool to alleviate the conflict of interest between creditors,shareholders and management,bond contract is of great significance to explore its restrictive effect on corporate over-investment.This paper constructs a creditor protection index which is based on the manual search of bond covenants information,and further studies its restrictive effect on corporate over-investment.The study found that good creditor protection helps to restrain the over-investment of the company.Further tests also show that creditor protection has a more significant effect on inhibiting over-investment in those enterprises with higher shareholder ownership,lower agency cost for management,poorer internal control and weaker legal environment,as well as those enterprises that are non-state-owned.