会计稳健性对超额商誉的抑制效应研究

The Constraint Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Excess Goodwill

本文以中国A股上市公司为样本,基于会计治理视角,探讨会计稳健性对超额商誉的影响。研究发现,企业会计稳健性越高,并购中形成的超额商誉越低,并且并购后三年内发生商誉减值的可能性越低,表明会计稳健性能够显著抑制超额商誉。进一步研究发现,会计稳健性在管理层代理成本较高和企业信息不对称程度较高场景下对超额商誉的负向影响更加显著,说明会计稳健性的这种抑制效应主要是通过缓减管理层代理成本和改善企业信息环境机制实现。本文结论丰富了并购商誉和会计稳健性的文献成果,对投资者、监管者等外部利益相关者具有现实启示意义。

This paper,based on the perspective of accounting governance,investigates the effect of accounting conservatism on excess acquired goodwill.Using the China’s listed firms as samples,we find that the acquirers’accounting conservatism has a significant negative impact on the excess goodwill,and also has a negative effect on the likelihood of goodwill impairment within three years following mergers and acquisitions.These findings indicate that accounting conservatism can significantly constrain the acquirers’excess goodwill.Furthermore,we show that the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess goodwill is more pronounced for the firms with higher management agency costs or with higher information asymmetry,indicating that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess goodwill is driven by the two mechanisms including reducing agency costs and improving information environment.This study enriches the literature on goodwill acquisitions and accounting conservatism,and provides implications for constraining goodwill bubbles and preventing financial risks.