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使真者必然主义与否定真理的使真者 被引量:5

Truthmaker Necessitarianism and Truthmakers for Negative Truths
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摘要 否定真理的使真者问题是使真者理论中的焦点问题。基于两个论题,即使真者最大主义和使真者必然主义,一些学者认为,我们将不得不承诺否定性存在,如否定事实、一般事实或缺乏,等等。出于对否定性存在的拒斥,人们常常把矛头指向使真者最大主义,但是这一进路的代价将是抛弃整个使真者概念。本文认为使真者必然主义应为否定性存在负责;关于使真者必然主义,当前支持它的两类论证都缺乏可信性,不仅如此,通过一个论证,本文将表明,使真者必然主义实质上等价于关于使真者的蕴含解释,而后者已被普遍认为是错误的。一旦抛弃使真者必然主义,那么我们将很容易在无需承诺否定性存在的情况下给出否定真理的使真者。 The issue about truthmakers for negative truths is at the core of the debate about the truth-makers.Some scholars believe that based on two theses,i.e.,Truthmaker Maximalism and Truthmaker Necessitarianism,we will have to commit to the existence of negative existentials,such as negative facts,general facts,or absence.For the rejection of negative existentials,people usually adopt the strategy of proving that Truthmaker Maximalism is not true.The price of this approach,however,will be to abandon the whole concept of truthmaker.In this paper,I try to demonstrate that Truthmaker Necessitarianism should be responsible for negative existentials,and,with regard to Truthmaker Necessitarianism,both types of arguments currently supporting it lack credibility.Moreover,I will show in this paper,by a simple argument,that Truthmaker Necessitarianism is essentially equivalent to the entailment account of truthmaker,which has been generally regarded as wrong.Once Truthmaker Necessitarianism is abandoned,then we will easily give the right truthmakers for negative truth without committing to the existence of negative existentials.
作者 李主斌 LI Zhubin(School of Marxism,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai,200240)
出处 《自然辩证法通讯》 CSSCI 北大核心 2021年第7期18-27,共10页 Journal of Dialectics of Nature
基金 国家社会科学基金项目“当代分析形而上学中的事实世界研究”(项目编号:20BZX031)。
关键词 使真者 否定真理 否定性存在 必然主义 本体论基础 Truthmakers Negative truths Negative existentials Truthmaker Necessitarianism Ontological ground
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