丹尼尔·丹尼特意识解释中的感受质问题

Exploring“Qualia”in Daniel Dennett’s Consciousness Explained

"感受质"是当代心智哲学分析中有关意识问题争论的焦点,围绕其是否是一种不可还原的主观特质,引发了物理主义与反物理主义两大阵营的激烈争论。丹尼特否认有主观感受质的存在,认为它只是属性二元论者和大多数普通人的一种错误幻想。他认为,各种意识现象,包括知觉、记忆、感受等,可能是在实现其相关表达时才得以确立的。异现象学方法作为丹尼特解释意识体验与感受的方法,其核心是,要利用我们执行和解释语言行为的能力,产生一系列主体关于其意识体验的信念,这些信念是考察意识感受的原始资料。丹尼特借用"意向立场"观证明了信念的实在性,从而论证了异现象学是解释意识感受和体验的可靠方法。

"Qualia"is the focus of controversy about consciousness in contemporary philosophy of mind.Whether it is an irreducible subjective trait has triggered fierce debates between physicalism and anti-physicalism.Dennett denies the existence of this subjective qualia,and believes that it is just a false fantasy of property dualists and most ordinary people.He believes that various consciousness phenomena,including perception,memory,feelings,etc.,may be established when their related expressions are realized.As Dennett’s method of interpreting conscious experience and feeling,heterophenomenology,its core is to use our ability to perform and interpret language behavior to generate a series of beliefs about the subject’s conscious experience.Dennett used the concept of"intentional position"to prove the reality of beliefs,thus demonstrating that phenomenology is a reliable method to explain conscious feelings and experiences.