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单面屏蔽防护对电磁信息安全的影响分析

Analysis of the Influence of One-side Shielding on the Safety of Electromagnetic Information
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摘要 恶意电磁攻击会威胁信息基础设施网络的运行安全和信息安全。针对计算机设备和网络的办公环境,采用导电玻璃幕墙进行局部电磁屏蔽的电磁防护方案,通过一致性几何绕射理论(UTD),计算矩形屏蔽体深遮挡的应用场景下多边绕射的辐射场分布。结合样板间单面屏蔽,模拟仿真微波段泄漏发射场分布图,并揭示了屏蔽体防护效能。应用室内通信模型,计算评估了室内方向的传播增益对安全距离的影响风险,样板间10 m×3 m导电玻璃幕墙防护效能仿真表明:采取屏蔽防护后,室外安全距离缩小了10倍以上,室内方向安全距离增大了1.30~1.56倍。 Malicious electromagnetic attack will threaten the operation security and information security of information infrastructure network.Aiming at the office environment of computer equipment and network,the electromagnetic protection scheme of local electromagnetic shielding with conductive glass curtain wall is adopted,and the radiation field distribution of multilateral diffraction under the application scene of rectangular shield with deep shielding is calculated through the uniform geometrical theory of diffraction(UTD).Combined with the one-side shielding of the sample room,the distribution of leakage emission field in the microwave section is simulated,and the shielding effectiveness is revealed.The indoor communication model is used to calculate and evaluate the impact risk of indoor propagation gain on safety distance.The protection effectiveness simulation of 10 m×3 m conductive glass curtain wall in the sample room shows that the outdoor safety distance is reduced by more than 10 times and the indoor direction safety distance is increased by 1.30~1.56 times after adopting shielding protection.
作者 王保国 韩曹政 张振林 Wang Baoguo;Han Caozheng;Zhang Zhenlin
出处 《安全与电磁兼容》 2021年第3期47-51,79,共6页 Safety & EMC
基金 山西省重点研发计划项目(201803D421001)。
关键词 电磁防护 屏蔽效能 电磁安全 导电玻璃幕墙 一致性几何绕射理论 electromagnetic protection shielding effectiveness electromagnetic safety conductive glass curtain wall uniform geometrical theory of diffraction(UTD)
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