考虑公平偏好的零售商主导型供应链均衡决策研究

The Impact of Fairness Preference on the Equilibrium Decisions of Retailer-led Supply Chain

考虑由具有批发定价权的零售商和生产规模不经济的制造商组成的零售商主导型供应链,构建仅制造商具有公平偏好、仅零售商具有公平偏好,以及双方同时具有公平偏好等三种情形下的Stackelberg博弈模型,探究上下游企业的公平偏好对供应链各成员企业的均衡决策与效用的影响。研究发现:(1)与无公平偏好时的最优产量相比,供应链成员(仅制造商、仅零售商和双方同时)具有公平偏好时制造商将会增加最优产量,提升供应链的运作效率,而且满足特定条件时批发价格契约可以实现供应链的协调。(2)双方同时具有公平偏好对供应链各成员企业的最优决策与效用的影响最为显著。(3)供应链各成员企业的最优决策与效用分别同上下游企业的公平偏好系数之间可能都不是简单的线性关系,具体还与消费者的价格敏感性和制造商的生产成本等因素密切相关。数值分析结果也证实了上述结论。

With the rapid development of the customer-oriented and experience economy,retail giants such as Amazon and Wal-Mart,which are closest to the end consumers,have rapidly dominated their supply chains,and obtained the power of wholesale pricing of products.This kind of supply chain which dominant the capital,information,and channels of the supply chain is called as"retailer-led supply chain".In the retailer-led supply chain,the upstream members are mainly small and medium-sized manufacturers in a weak position,which is often characterized by diseconomies of scale in production.The dominant retailer may encroach on the profits of the manufacturers in order to gain more share of the profits.The two sides will inevitably have conflicts due to the distribution of profits.People attach great importance to fairness preference in the transaction process,and fairness is an important factor to maintain cooperation.Taking the partner’s profits as a fair reference,a utility model considering the disadvantageous inequality of the manufacturers,and the advantageous inequality of the retailor is built.In this paper,the influence of the production diseconomies of the manufacturer,the shift in the wholesale pricing power from the manufacturer to the retailer,and the fair preferences of one side/both sides of the upstream and downstream firms on the supply chain equilibrium decision-making and operational efficiency are studied.The main work in this paper includes the following three parts.First,the equilibrium decision of supply chain without considering the fair preference of retailers and manufacturers as a comparative benchmark is investigated.Second,the optimal decision-making and utility of each member of the supply chain under the three conditions are explored:only the manufacturer with fair preference,only the retailer with fair preference,and both with fair preference.The influence of the member enterprises’fair preference on the optimal decision-making behavior and utility of the supply chain is also discussed.Finally,the numerical analysis results confirm the above conclusion.The results show that,first,compared with the optimal output when supply chain members have no fair preference,the optimal output when supply chain members have fair preference(three preferences)is higher,and the efficiency of supply chain is improved,furthermore,under certain conditions,the wholesale price contract can achieve coordination of the supply chain.Second,the fairness preference of both parties has the most significant influence on the optimal decision and utility of each member enterprise in the supply chain.Third,there may not be a simple linear relationship between the optimal decision(or utility)of each member enterprise in the supply chain and the equity preference coefficient of upstream and downstream enterprises,but the specific factors should be closely related to the price sensitivity of consumers and the production cost of manufacturers.