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考虑道德风险与货损追溯的物流货损控制合约设计 被引量:2

On Contract Designing for Logistical Freight Damage Control Considering Moral Hazard and Damage Tracing
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摘要 考虑物流货损受包装合理化和运输合理化的双重影响,研究了货主企业面向运输企业的最优合约设计问题。在单边道德风险环境下,运输企业的运输合理化努力不可见;在双边道德风险环境下,运输企业的运输合理化努力和货主企业的包装合理化努力均不可见。基于委托-代理理论,针对货主企业货损追溯能力是否可控分别设计了两种风险环境下的激励与惩罚合约。研究发现,要使物流货损率降到最低,在单边道德风险环境下,单一的激励合约或单一的惩罚合约都能够起作用,但是在双边道德风险环境下,激励合约和惩罚合约必须联合使用;双边道德风险环境下的最优合约也适用于单边道德风险环境;此外,货主企业的货损追溯能力越强,面向运输企业的惩罚力度应当越小;与货损追溯能力外生时相比,货损追溯能力为内生时的惩罚力度应当更小。 Freight damaging is one of the prominent problems in the process of logistics service.In order to control cargo freight damage,the optimal cooperation contracts between the cargo owner and the carrier were studied in this paper.The background is that the cargo owner is in charge of cargo packaging,whereas the carrier is responsible for cargo transportation.The damage can be caused by packaging or transportation.Both the owner and the carrier could endogenously make efforts to improve packaging rationalization or transportation rationalization,and then lower the logistical freight damage rate.However,as their efforts is not observable,they have the motivation of opportunism,leading to the moral-hazard.In the single moral-hazard case,the carrier’s transportation rationalization effort is not observable,whereas in the double moral-hazard case,neither the cargo owner’s packaging rationalization effort nor the carrier’s transportation rationalization effort is observable.A reward/penalty contract for each case was designed considering whether the owner’s damage traceability is controllable.Taking the optimal packaging rationalization and transportation rationalization efforts in the case of information symmetry as a reference,the contracts parameters in different symmetric cases were determined based on Principle-Agent model.It is found that in the single moral-hazard case,the reward or the penalty contract alone could motive the owner and the carrier to exert the aforementioned optimal efforts,and thus reduce the damage rate to the minimum level.But in the double moral-hazard case,the two contracts must be combined together to reach the same effect;The optimal contact for the double moral-hazard case also applies to the single moral-hazard case;With stronger damage traceability,the owner is advised to decrease the penalty on the carrier;Besides,compared with the case when damage traceability is uncontrollable,the owner should also lower the penalty when it is controllable.Our contribution lies in constructing the relationship between the damage rate and the bilateral efforts of packaging rationalization and transportation rationalization,and simultaneously considering the moral-hazard and damage tracing problems in designing the cooperation contracts.The results of the study will be helpful for the cargo owner to coordinate with carrier in lowering the freight damage rate.
作者 宋杰珍 常健聪 SONG Jie-zhen;CHANG Jian-cong(Business School,Shanghai Jian Qiao University,Shanghai 201306,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2021年第6期168-178,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划(17YJA790007) 上海市教委民办高校重大内涵建设项(2016-SHNGE-02NH) 上海市国际商务专业学位点建设项目(KYJF18AASH1816)。
关键词 道德风险 货损追溯 货损控制 激励与惩罚合约 moral hazard freight damage tracing freight damage control reward and penalty contract
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