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基于博弈论和拍卖的数据定价综述 被引量:17

A survey of game theory and auction-based data pricing
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摘要 在大数据时代,随着数据爆炸式的增长,将数据视为一种商品,建立一个高效的数据交易市场,通过数据交易市场为数据拥有者提供利益补偿,为数据需求者提供数据或服务,使得数据能够在数据拥有者和数据需求者之间充分地自由流动显得尤为重要。然而如何为数据设定合理的价格是必须考虑的。对基于博弈论和拍卖的数据定价进行了研究,调查了该分类下不同的数据定价模型,并将其分为不同的类型,综合比较各个模型的优劣。将常见的数据交易市场进行分类,指出不同的数据交易框架在实现过程中的优点和挑战。对已有的数据定价研究进行总结,以便数据定价领域的学者能更轻松地掌握该领域的研究现状及重点。 In the era of big data,with the explosive growth of data,regarding data as a commodity and establishing an efficient data trading market is a important thing.By data trading’s way,profit compensation is provided for data owners,and raw data or services are provided for data consumers,so that data can flow fully freely between data owners and data consumers.However,how to set a reasonable price for the data is necessary.Data pricing based on game theory and auctions was investigated.Different data pricing models under this category were investigated.These models were divided into different types,and the advantages and disadvantages of each model were compared comprehensively.Then,common data trading markets were classified,and the advantages and challenges of different data transaction frameworks in the implementation process were pointed out.A summary of existing data pricing research was made,so that scholars in the field of data pricing can more easily grasp the current research status and the key of data pricing.
作者 张小伟 江东 袁野 ZHANG Xiaowei;JIANG Dong;YUAN Ye(School of Computer Science and Engineering,Northeastern University,Shenyang 110819,China;School of Computer Science&Technology,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China)
出处 《大数据》 2021年第4期61-79,共19页 Big Data Research
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(No.60933001,No.61932004,No.62002054,No.61732003,No.61729201) 中央高校基本科研基金资助项目(No.N181605012)。
关键词 数据定价 数据交易市场 博弈论 拍卖 data pricing data trading market game theory auction
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