规则、原则和实施证券法的竞争

Rules,Principles and the Competition to Enforce the Securities Law

证券执法可分为规则执法和原则执法。与原则执法相比,规则执法成本较低且争议较少。因为特定规则倾向于反映行政制度的技术要求,而原则则反映更为广泛的社会价值观。行业执法者可能会根据行业价值来狭义地解释原则。相反,公共价值的维护者倾向根据社会价值观进行原则执法,但有时也会因其政治抱负的原因超出、偏离既定目标。企业家类执法者更倾向于支持原则执法,但会因个人逐利原因而产生颇富争议的案件结果。在集中式执法与分散式执法之间的选择从根本上表征的实际是在与证券执法有关的价值一元论和价值多元论之间的抉择。证券集中执法论背后的动机是消除反映不同价值观的执法方法之间的冲突。但采用集中执法的代价是抹杀了执法人员多样化所带来的优势。通过识别不同执法者的特殊优势而非专注于是否产生最佳执法量,分散执法是最合理的执法方式。

Securities enforcement can be divided into two categories:rule-enforcement and principle-enforcement.Rule-enforcement is less costly and controversial because specific rules tend to reflect the technical requirements of an administrative regime while general principles can reflect a wider range of values.Industry enforcers are likely to interpret principles narrowly based on industry values.Public-values enforcers are willing to enforce principles in light of social values but may overreach because of political ambition.Entrepreneurial enforcers are most willing to invest in principle-enforcement but also have a tendency to bring questionable cases for profit.The choice between a centralized and decentralized enforcement system is fundamentally a choice between a one-dimensional and multidimensional conception of the values relevant to securities enforcement.Proposals to centralize securities enforcement are motivated by a desire to eliminate the conflicts that can arise between enforcement approaches that reflect different values.The cost of such centralization is that the advantages diverse enforcers bring to the table will be eliminated.A decentralized system is best justified by recognizing the particular strengths of different enforcers rather than focusing on whether an optimal amount of enforcement is produced.