摘要
移动电子商务的发展带动了网络订餐行业的兴起与蓬勃发展,然而由于食品生产商过度分散以及监管薄弱等问题的存在,网络订餐行业食品安全问题依然严重。本文以政府监管下的网络订餐平台食品安全监管为研究对象,构建了以政府-平台-商家为基础的三方博弈演化模型,并通过演化仿真分析探讨了不同监管制度对平台和商家策略选择的影响。研究结果表明,当外部监管不足时,商家缺乏自律经营动机;平台保证金制度可在一定程度上约束商家不自律经营行为;加大政府处罚力度和监管效率,可提高平台参与监管的积极性以及商家自律经营的动机。
The flourishment of online food ordering accompanied by development in mobile E-commerce has caused trouble concerning food security due to over-distribution and deficit in supervision system.This paper used evolution of tripartite game based on government-platform-business,Probing into the impact various supervision mechanisms have on strategy making of platform and business.Results show that,when lacking outside supervising,business finds few motivations for self-discipline;recognizances imposed on business,to a certain extent,bind operation violations;and increasing penalty and supervision efficiency raises positivity from platform in participating supervision and induces self-discipline of business.
作者
胡春华
孙思源
周新民
陈聪
HU Chun-hua;SUN Si-yuan;ZHOU Xin-min;CHEN Cong(Research Institute of Big Data and Internet Innovation,Hunan University of T echnology and Business,Changsha 410205,Hunan,China;School of Computer and Information Engineering,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,Hunan,China;School ofEconomics and Trade,Hunan University of Technology and Business,Changsha 410205,Hunan,China)
出处
《消费经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第3期80-87,共8页
Consumer Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72072053)
国家自然科学基金重大项目(71991463)。
关键词
网络订餐平台
食品安全
三方博弈
政府监管
Online Food Ordering Platform
Food Security
Tripartite Game
Government Supervision