建筑废弃物资源化利用相关方演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Relevant Parties in C&D Waste Resource Utilization

为解决建筑废弃物资源化利用进程中政策效力不强的问题,以演化博弈论为基础分析再生建材供需中政府的激励作用.选取建筑废弃物资源化利用工作中的三方利益相关者,分别构建"政府—建材厂商""政府—建筑施工企业"的演化博弈模型,分析政府、建材厂商、建设施工企业的博弈行为决策,得出实现博弈均衡过程中帕累托最优的策略.演化博弈结果显示:政府通过提高经济补贴与制裁,降低建材研发生产与使用的成本,促进建材厂商研发生产再生建材,促进建筑施工企业购买使用再生建材是稳定的演化途径.并根据演化博弈结果,提出了相应的发展建议.

To solve the problem of designing ineffective policies in the process of resource utilization of C&D waste,an evolutionary game theory is used to analyze the role of government incentives in the supply and demand of recycled building materials.Three stakeholders are selected to build the evolutionary game models for"government-buildings material manufacturers"and"government-construction enterprises"respectively.The game behavior of government,building material manufacturers and construction enterprises in the process of C&D waste recycling are analyzed,and the Pareto-optimal strategies are analyzed to achieve the equilibrium process of the evolutionary game.The results of the evolutionary game show that stable evolutionary pathways are to increase economic subsidies and sanctions,reduce the cost of research and development,production,and usage of building materials,promote the research and development and production of recycled building materials by building material manufacturers,and promote the purchase and use of recycled building materials by construction enterprises.Finally,based on the results of the evolutionary game,development suggestions are made in four aspects:mandatory policies for the research and development and production of building materials,standardization of the production of recycled building materials,mandatory policies for the use of recycled building materials,and standards for the use of recycled building materials.