基于博弈分析的开放许可制度优化研究

Research on Optimization of Open Licensing System Based on Game Analysis

专利开放许可制度促进科技成果转化与传播有赖于制度设计上的科学性与合理性,为此,以古诺竞争模型为基础构建序贯博弈机制,分两阶段分析专利权人和专利实施主体在专利交易市场中的行为可能形成的6种局面,通过分析均衡支付求解占优策略,以期进一步优化我国专利开放许可制度。研究发现,在现有市场和法制环境下,无论专利权人是否开放许可,专利实施主体都会选择侵权生产;而要鼓励专利权人提出开放许可声明且专利实施主体接受声明中的条件,需要足够大的市场容量、开放许可费和专利侵权赔偿额期望值。由此建议,可以采取规定差异化的专利年费减免制度、放宽对专利开放许可声明内容的约束、赋予专利行政部门一定范围的裁量权、打造并充分利用专利交易平台,以及构建侵权责任证明分配体系等措施对专利开放许可制度进行优化,从而激励专利权人实施开放许可以及专利实施主体接受开放许可。

The promotion of the transformation and dissemination of scientific and technological achievements by the patent open licensing system depends on the scientificity and rationality of the system design.For this reason,this paper constructs a sequential game mechanism based on the Cournot competition model,analyze the 6 situations of the behavior of the patentee and the patent implementation subject in the trading market in two stages,solves the dominant strategy through analysis of balanced payment,in order to further optimize China's patent open licensing system.The study finds that in the current market and legal environment,regardless of whether the patentee opens the license,the patent implementer will choose to infringe production;and to encourage the patent owner to submit an open license statement and the patent implementer accepts the conditions in the statement,large enough market capacity,open license fees,and patent infringement compensation expectations are required.Therefore,in order to optimize the patent open licensing system in China,the paper suggests that a differentiated patent annual fee reduction and exemption system can be adopted,the restrictions on the content of patent open license statement can be relaxed,the patent administration department should be given a certain range of discretionary powers,the patent transaction platform can be built and fully utilized,and the distribution of infringement liability certification system can be constructed,etc.