高管过度自信对创新投入的影响研究——基于薪酬业绩敏感性的调节作用

The Influence of Executive Overconfidence on Innovation Investment Based on the Moderating Effect of Pay Performance Sensitivity

企业创新投入的提升对于社会经济发展具有重要的依托作用,作为创新活动的主要决策者,高管的过度自信程度对企业创新投入有着举足轻重的影响。以2015-2019年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,运用多元回归分析探究高管过度自信对企业创新投入的影响。结果表明:高管过度自信会正向促进企业的创新投入;高管薪酬业绩敏感性可以作为一种规范机制抑制过度自信对创新投入的过度促进作用。研究有助于将高管薪酬业绩敏感性作为一种治理机制引入企业的研发过程,规避高管个人非理性因素产生的负向影响。

The promotion of enterprise innovation investment plays an important supporting role in social and economic development.As the main decision-maker of innovation activities,the overconfidence of executives has a decisive impact on enterprise innovation investment.Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2015 to 2019 as samples,this paper uses multiple regression analysis to explore the impact of executive overconfidence on enterprise innovation investment.The results show that managerial overconfidence can positively promote the innovation investment of enterprises and that performance sensitivity of executive compensation can be used as a normative mechanism to restrain the over promotion of overconfidence on innovation investment.The research helps to introduce the performance sensitivity of executive compensation as a governance mechanism into the R&D process of enterprises,and avoid the negative impact of individual irrational factors of executives.