经济政策不确定性与大股东掏空行为实证分析

Empirical Analysis of Economic Policy Uncertainty and Hollowing Behavior of Major Shareholders

以2009—2019年中国资本市场沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,分析并检验了经济政策不确定性对大股东掏空行为的影响.研究结果表明:经济政策不确定性越大,大股东掏空程度越高;良好的内部控制制度可以缓解经济政策不确定性对大股东掏空行为带来的正向影响;经济后果分析表明,由经济政策不确定引起的大股东掏空行为会进一步导致上市公司短期经营绩效和长期市场价值下降.文章基于宏观经济政策视角拓展了大股东掏空行为影响因素的相关文献,有助于为抑制大股东掏空行为提供新的思路.

This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies in China’s capital market from 2009 to 2019 as the research objects to analyze and test the impact of economic policy uncertainty on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.The results show that the greater the uncertainty of economic policy,the higher the degree of hollowing out of major shareholders.A good internal control system can alleviate the positive influence of economic policy uncertainty on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.The economic consequence analysis shows that the tunneling behavior of major shareholders caused by the uncertainty of economic policies will further lead to the decline of short-term business performance and long-term market value of listed companies.Based on the macroeconomic policy perspective,this paper expands the relevant literature on the influencing factors of the tunneling behavior of major shareholders,which is helpful to provide new ideas for restraining the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.