制度设计何以助力官员行为“最优解”?

How does the Mechanism Design Promote the “Optimal Solution” of Official Behavior?

在全面"疫情问责风暴"下,问责是否总能助力官员的积极行为?激励制度应当如何设计才能助力官员行为的"最优解"?本研究以官员激励制度化为起点,深度剖析不同风险事件下基层政府官员的行为选择决策。研究重点关注"激励制度-官员行为"这一基本逻辑关系,融合微观经济学模型,从制度的顶层设计上助力官员行为的最优解,探索提高基层政府官员执政水平的现实路径。研究发现:"激励鸿沟"的制度设置可以有效诱导基层政府官员的尽职作为;"激励梯度"的制度设置是实现基层政府官员风险决策优化的关键驱动;"期望收益略大于期望成本"是制度设计的基本原则;专业人士的决策话语权;用系统思维推进制度的顶层设计是正确抉择的基本前提。

Under China’s comprehensive "Epidemic Accountability Storm", does the accountability always promote positive behavior among officials? How should the incentive mechanism be designed to realize the "optimal solution" of official behavior? Starting with the view of institutionalization of official incentive, this study takes an in-depth look on the behavior choice of government officials under different risk events. This study focuses on the basic logical relationship between "incentive mechanism" and "official behavior", integrating with microeconomic modeling, trying to realize the "optimal solution" of official behavior from the top design of the mechanism and exploring realistic ways to improve the performance of government officials. It is found that the mechanism setting of "incentive gap" can effectively induce officials’ responsible behavior;the mechanism setting of "incentive gradient" is the key driver to promote the optimization of officials’ decision-making under uncertainty;"the expected benefit is slightly greater than the expected cost" is the basic principle of mechanism design;the decision-making right of specialists and the top-level design of the system with systematic thinking is the basic premise of correct choice.