笛卡尔与认知科学中的表征争议

Descartes and the Debate of Representationalism and Anti-Representationalism in Cognitive Science

当前认知科学基础理论研究中,以动力系统理论为代表的反表征主义似乎已经战胜了传统表征主义。这场争议的结果在哲学上表现为对笛卡尔哲学的批判,即放弃笛卡尔的身心二元论。但本文将论证这种批判是具有误导性的并且是由对笛卡尔思想的教条式理解所引发的。为实现该目的,本文将从笛卡尔的表征主义认识论、情感与身体、行动哲学三个层面进行分析,证明笛卡尔并不支持表征理论的论述,同时反表征理论所批判的核心,即笛卡尔忽视了身体,乃是由对其形而上学和心理生理学区分的误解导致的。

In the current researches of cognitive science,the anti-representationalism,like dynamical system theory,seems to have overcome the traditional representationalism.And the philosophical result of this debate turns out to be the critique on Descartes’philosophy,i.e.,mind-body dualism.This article argues that this critique on Descartes is mistaken and caused by some dogmatic image of Descartes’philosophy.For this aim,this article,with a detailed analysis on Descartes’representationalism,theory of emotions and body,and philosophy of action,proves that Descartes himself does not acknowledge the representationalism theory for cognitive science,and the core of anti-representationalism,i.e.,Descartes’neglect of the body,is also caused by misunderstanding the distinction between his metaphysics and psychophysiology.