同谘合谋还是同舟共济:非控股股东网络权力与股价崩盘风险

Collusion or Coordination:Non-Controlling Shareholders’Network Power and Stock Price Collapse Risk

非控股股东可以抑制控股股东和管理层隐藏坏消息的行为,也可以通过合谋而形成利益输送渠道,因此非控股股东对于维护资本市场的秩序至关重要。从股价崩盘的研究视角,考察了非控股股东网络权力对崩盘风险的影响。研究发现:非控股股东网络权力越大,越能降低企业的股价崩盘风险。进一步的机制分析发现:非控股股东网络权力是通过嵌入效应和治理效应抑制股价崩盘风险的;前者通过网络信息关系和结构嵌入效应抑制股价崩盘风险,后者通过对控股股东掏空和管理层"捂盘"行为的治理而降低股价崩盘风险。

Non-controlling shareholders can restrain the contro lling shareholders or management from hiding bad news,and also can form a channel of interest transmission through collusion,which are crucial to the maintenance of the economic order of the capital market.From the perspective of stock price collapse,this paper examines the impact of non-controlling shareholders’network power on collapse risks.The findings show that the greater the non-controlling shareholders’network power,the more likely they can reduce the stock price collapse risks.The result of the mechanism analysis indicates that non-controlling shareholders’network power can reduce stock price collapse risks through the embedding effect and the governance effect,the former restrains the share price collapse risks through the embedding effect of network information relationship and structure,while the latter restrains the share price collapse risks through the governance effect of the tunneling behaviors of controlling shareholders and the covering behaviors of the management.