薪酬激励、宕账制度与上海钱庄业投机行为

Salary Incentive,Overdrafts and Speculation in Shanghai Native Bank

钱庄与票号同为旧式金融机构的代表,然而钱庄的投机性却比票号严重得多。本文从上海钱庄业所有权与经营权相分离的特点出发,运用委托代理理论从薪酬激励的角度来分析钱庄经理与职员的投机行为,特别是通过对钱庄与票号薪酬制度的对比,辅以对顺康钱庄薪酬制度变迁的个案研究,揭示上海钱庄业普遍采用固定薪俸与分红相结合的薪酬激励方式,因固定薪俸过低、分红间隔过久,反而诱发了钱庄经理与职员的投机心理。民国初年,钱业薪酬结构的变动、宕账制度的废除则有效抑制了钱庄业的投机行为。

Shanghai native bank and Shanxi draft bank are both representatives of old-fashioned financial institutions in China.However,the former was much more speculative than the latter.Based on the separation of ownership and management rights of Shanghai native bank,this paper applies principal-agent theory to analyze speculative behaviors of bank managers and employees from the perspective of salary incentive.It reveals an important reason for the prevalence of speculation in Shanghai native bank through both comparative study and case study.Before the Republic of China,Shanghai native bank adopted an incentive method that combined fixed salary and dividends,which aimed to share risks and benefits between bank managers,staff and shareholders.However,the unreasonable salary structure,namely,low fixed wages,long dividend intervals,and overdrafts induced the speculative psychology of the bank manager and staff.As a result,the incentive mechanism of Shanghai native bank failed to align the interests of shareholders and managers,however,which led to serious speculation.In the early years of the Republic of China,the change of the salary structure and the abolition of overdrafts played an important role in the reduction of speculation.