火电与绿电竞合策略对市场均衡及议价能力的影响研究——基于可再生能源消纳责任权重下发电商市场行为博弈分析

Study on the influence of cooptation strategy of thermal power and green power on market equilibrium and bargaining power——Game analysis of market behavior of power producers based on the weight of renewable energy consumption responsibility

可再生能源消纳责任权重制度的出台,意味着用户需要增加对绿电的消纳,这一转变对发电商的竞争策略产生了重大影响。本文给出了政策变动下,火电商和绿电商可能采取的策略行为,并采用Stackelberg博弈模型和合作博弈模型分析不同政策参数对发电商策略行为及市场均衡点的影响。分析结果表明:合作博弈下发电商收益大于竞争下发电商收益,发电商间会自发寻求合作,且合作增加的利润有助于火电商摆脱亏损困境,也能够帮助新能源发电企业在"去补贴"趋势下站稳脚跟。而发电厂商间的合作会抬高上网电价,降低市场出清电量,政府应出台相关政策对发电厂商间的合作进行适度限制。

The introduction of the renewable energy consumption responsibility weight system means that users need to increase the consumption of green electricity. This change has a significant impact on the competitive strategy of power generation companies. In this paper, the possible strategic behaviors of thermal and green e-commerce companies under policy changes are presented, and the effects of different policy parameters on the strategic behaviors and market equilibrium point of power generation companies are analyzed by using Stackelberg game model and cooperative game model. The analysis results show that the income of power generation companies under cooperative game is greater than that under competition. Power generation companies will spontaneously seek cooperation, and the increased profits from cooperation can help thermal power companies get rid of the loss dilemma, and also help new energy power generation companies to stand firm under the trend of "de-subsidy". However, the cooperation between power producers will increase the on-grid price and reduce the amount of electricity cleared from the market. Therefore, the government should introduce relevant policies to moderately restrict the cooperation between power producers.