摘要
可再生能源消纳责任权重制度的出台,意味着用户需要增加对绿电的消纳,这一转变对发电商的竞争策略产生了重大影响。本文给出了政策变动下,火电商和绿电商可能采取的策略行为,并采用Stackelberg博弈模型和合作博弈模型分析不同政策参数对发电商策略行为及市场均衡点的影响。分析结果表明:合作博弈下发电商收益大于竞争下发电商收益,发电商间会自发寻求合作,且合作增加的利润有助于火电商摆脱亏损困境,也能够帮助新能源发电企业在"去补贴"趋势下站稳脚跟。而发电厂商间的合作会抬高上网电价,降低市场出清电量,政府应出台相关政策对发电厂商间的合作进行适度限制。
The introduction of the renewable energy consumption responsibility weight system means that users need to increase the consumption of green electricity. This change has a significant impact on the competitive strategy of power generation companies. In this paper, the possible strategic behaviors of thermal and green e-commerce companies under policy changes are presented, and the effects of different policy parameters on the strategic behaviors and market equilibrium point of power generation companies are analyzed by using Stackelberg game model and cooperative game model. The analysis results show that the income of power generation companies under cooperative game is greater than that under competition. Power generation companies will spontaneously seek cooperation, and the increased profits from cooperation can help thermal power companies get rid of the loss dilemma, and also help new energy power generation companies to stand firm under the trend of "de-subsidy". However, the cooperation between power producers will increase the on-grid price and reduce the amount of electricity cleared from the market. Therefore, the government should introduce relevant policies to moderately restrict the cooperation between power producers.
出处
《价格理论与实践》
北大核心
2020年第12期139-143,共5页
Price:Theory & Practice
基金
国家社科基金重大项目,面向国家能源安全的智慧能源创新模式与政策协同机制研究(19ZDA081)。
关键词
可再生能源
消纳
绿证
发电厂商
市场均衡
议价能力
Renewable energy
Consumption
Green certificates
Power generation manufacturers
Market equilibrium
Bargaining power