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上市公司实施股权激励存在的风险及对策研究--以海大集团为例 被引量:2

Study on the Risks and Countermeasures of Equity Incentive in Listed Companies--Take Haida Group as an Example
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摘要 股权激励的诞生被认为是有效缓解委托代理问题的工具之一,它通过促使经营者以“主人翁”身份积极参与企业管理,使企业获得可持续发展机会。已有文献重点关注股权激励效果,鲜有文献讨论股权激励实施可能存在的风险及对策。本文以上市公司海大集团为例,探讨其股权激励实施中可能存在的风险并提出控制风险的对策。研究结论有助于上市公司在实施股权激励过程中有效规避风险,更好地实现企业股东价值最大化和企业价值最大化。 The birth of equity incentive is considered to be one of the effective tools to alleviate the principal-agent problem.It enables enterprises to obtain sustainable development opportunities by encouraging the managers to actively participate in the operation and management of enterprises as“masters”.The existing research focuses on the effect of equity incentive,rarely discusses the possible risks and Countermeasures of equity incentive implementation.Taking Haida group,this paper discusses the possible risks in the implementation of equity incentive and puts forward the countermeasures to control the risks.The conclusion is helpful for listed companies to effectively avoid risks in the process of implementing equity incentive,and better realize the maximization of shareholder value and enterprise value.
作者 李艳平 张雪伍 申明君 LI Yan-ping;ZHANG Xue-wu;SHEN Ming-jun(Jiangsu University of Technology Business School,Changzhou,Jiangsu 213001)
出处 《江苏商论》 2021年第8期79-81,共3页 Jiangsu Commercial Forum
基金 2018年江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目“客户关系对企业债务期限结构的影响及传导路径研究”(2018SJA1726) 2018年江苏高校哲学社会科学研究基金项目“产业链视角下基于神经网络的P2P网贷平台风险预警研究”(2018SJA1729) 2011年国家社科基金重大项目“中国会计通史系列问题研究”(11&ZD145)。
关键词 股权激励 风险 对策 equity incentive risk Countermeasures
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