摘要
最惠国条款(MFN条款)是买卖双方间的商业安排,平台最惠国条款(PMFN条款)则是一种“第三方协议”。平台不直接决定商品价格是PMFN条款的产生根源,所以不存在批发模式下的PMFN条款。PMFN条款会引发市场竞争中的共谋效应和排他效应,这会导致商品价格提高。目前各国反垄断当局普遍在垄断协议制度下分析PMFN条款的竞争问题,这是一种偏实用主义的做法,主要考虑的是法律适用的便利和传统,而非PMFN条款本身的性质。滥用市场支配地位制度也是规制PMFN条款的必要手段。在认定PMFN条款是否构成垄断协议时,需要注意代理关系的影响。欧美判例都在垄断协议的认定中确立了“代理例外”规则,不过该规则的本意是在代理关系中排除纵向垄断协议的认定,且只认可与代理业务直接相关的限制性内容。当PMFN条款构成横向垄断协议的一部分或者促成了卖方之间的横向共谋时,“代理例外”规则没有适用余地。而且,PMFN条款属于代理人(平台)对本人(卖方)的限制,不符合“代理例外”规则的适用范围。
Most favored nation clauses(MFNs)are commercial arrangements between the buyer and the seller,while the platform most favored nation clauses(PMFNs)are third party agreements.In the agency model of sales,the platform does not directly determine the commodity price,which is the origin of PMFNs,so there are no PMFNs in the wholesale model.PMFNs will lead to collusion effects and exclusive effects in market competition,which will lead to the increase of commodity prices.At present,the anti-monopoly authorities in various countries generally analyze PMFNs under the system of monopoly agreements,which is a pragmatic approach,that is,they mainly consider the convenience and tradition of law application,rather than the nature of PMFNs.The system of abuse of dominance is also an essential approach to regulate PMFNs.When determining whether PMFNs are monopoly agreements,we need to pay attention to the influence of agency relationship.Both Europe and America have established the agency exception rule in the determination of monopoly agreements in case law.But the original intention of the rule is to exclude the determination of vertical restrictions in agency relationship,and only recognize the restrictions directly related to agency business.When the PMFNs constitute a part of a horizontal restriction or facilitate collusion between sellers,the agency exception rule has no scope of application.Moreover,the PMFNs are the restrictions of the agent(platforms)to the principal(sellers),which do not fall within the scope of the agent exception rule.
作者
焦海涛
JIAO Haitao(Civil,Commercial and Economic Law School,China University of Political Science and Law,Beijing 100088,China)
出处
《商业经济与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第5期71-84,共14页
Journal of Business Economics
基金
北京市社会科学基金项目“反垄断法视野下的企业数据行为治理”(20FXC019)。