再制造商主导下制造/再制造系统的产品担保策略研究

Product Warranty Decisions in a Remanufacturer-led Manufacturing/Remanufacturing System

制造/再制造系统的产品担保策略直接影响产品销量与企业利润。基于主从博弈理论分别探究了原制造商与再制造商均不提供担保、仅原制造商提供新品担保、仅再制造商提供再制造品担保以及双方均为各自产品提供担保四种情形下的再制造商主导型制造/再制造系统的均衡定价、担保策略与双方利润,进而结合理论推导和数值算例将三种担保情形与无担保情形进行比较。研究结果表明,当产品担保敏感系数较高时,再制造商实施再制造品担保能够在不损害原制造商利益的前提下,实现自身利润的改善。当消费者的再制造品偏好较低时,存在较高的回收率,使得双方均提供产品担保能够形成双赢局面;而当消费者偏好处于中等水平及以上时,则更可能导致双方的两败俱伤。当产品的担保敏感系数较低时,双方中的任一方实施产品担保均是不经济的。

Product warranty decisions in manufacturing/remanufacturing system directly influence product sales volumes and enterprises’profits.Based on leader-follower game theory,the equilibrium prices,warranty decisions and profits of original equipment manufacturer(OEM)and third-party remanufacturer(TPR)are examined in a remanufacturer-led manufacturing/remanufacturing system.Four cases are considered respectively:neither OEM nor TPR provides product warranty,only the OEM provides warranty for new products,only the TPR provides warranty for remanufactured products and both parties provide warranties for their products.Then comparisons between three warranty cases and no warranty case are conducted combined with theoretical derivation and numerical examples.The results show that when the sensitivity coefficient of product warranty is relatively higher,the TPR’s warranty for remanufactured products can improve its own profit on condition that the benefit of the OEM is not hurt.When the consumers’preference for the remanufactured products is relatively lower,there exist higher collection rates that can realize"win-win"situation under the case that both parties provide warranties for their products;in contrast,when the consumers’preference is above the median level,both parties suffer losses under this warranty case.When the sensitivity coefficient of product warranty is relatively lower,it is uneconomical for either of both parties to provide product warranty.