矿产资源开发过程中央地两级政府监管博弈研究

A Game Study of Supervision of Central and Local Governments in the Process of Mineral Resources Exploitation

矿产资源开发过程中央地两级政府的监管关系一直备受关注。本文通过建立矿产资源监管演化博弈模型,研究中央政府与地方政府相互之间的行为演化特征及达到稳定均衡状态的关键性因素。采用MATLAB进行数值仿真模拟分析,得到演化博弈模型的理想稳定均衡策略。研究结果表明:央地两级政府监管策略能否达到稳定均衡状态取决于二者在博弈过程中获得的净收益值、耗费的成本、中央政府的监管力度以及地方政府失去的机会成本,同时博弈双方的初始状态对达到稳定均衡状态也存在一定的影响;央地两级政府在博弈过程中的最佳策略组合为{消极监管,积极执行}。为此,本文对中央政府和地方政府如何提高矿产资源监管水平提出了政策建议。

In the process of mineral resources development,the regulatory relationship between the central and local governments has always been the focus of social attention.Through the establishment of evolutionary game model and analysis of dynamic game model,it is found between the central and local government behavior evolution characteristics and the key factor reaches a stable equilibrium state.The optimal stability strategy of the evolutionary game model is obtained through numerical simulation analysis with Matlab.The research results show that the epicenter in the two levels of government regulation strategy can achieve stable equilibrium depends on both in the process of game of net profit,cost of cost,supervision of the central government and the local government in the process of game lost opportunity cost,at the same time game both sides of the initial state of stable equilibrium state also has certain influence;Central to two levels of government in the process of game to take the best strategy for{negative supervision,actively perform}.Finally,some effective policy suggestions are put forward for the central and local governments to supervise mineral resources.