控股股东股权质押、失去控制权风险与公司财务舞弊

Controlling Shareholders’Stock Pledge,Risk of Losing Control and Corporate Financial Fraud

基于2003—2017年我国上市公司的数据,使用部分可观测的Bivariate Probit回归模型考察控股股东股权质押是否及如何对公司财务舞弊产生影响。研究表明,控股股东股权质押比例与公司财务舞弊可能性间呈U形关系。进一步研究发现:当控股股东是国有企业时,这一关系并不存在;当第二大股东持股比例接近控股股东或股价跌至强制平仓线附近时,两者之间的关系更为密切,在质押比例更低的情况下,质押比例上升就会提高上市公司财务舞弊的可能性。证据显示,帮助控股股东维护其控制权是上市公司财务舞弊的动机。

Based on data of Chinese listed companies from 2003-2017,Bivariate Probit model with partial observability is used to investigate the effects of stock pledge by controlling shareholder on corporate’s financial reporting fraud and the mechanism through which stock pledge affects financial reporting fraud.Study finds a U-shaped link between stock pledge and financial reporting fraud.Further studies find that when controlling shareholder is state-owned enterprise,there is no U-shaped link between stock pledge and financial reporting fraud;when controlling shareholder does not hold a wide lead in ownership over the second-largest shareholder or share price crashes close to mandatory liquidation line,the U-shaped link is more pronounced,and stock pledge increases the likelihood of financial reporting fraud with lower stock pledge ratio.Evidence shows that helping controlling shareholder to maintain its control on the corporate is a motivation of financial reporting fraud.