摘要
目的:通过研究国家组织药品集中采购和使用联合采购办公室(以下简称“联采办”)与中标企业在超额供应问题上的利益博弈,探讨鼓励中标企业加大高层次创新投入的优化策略,特别是如何引导中标企业在超额供应与高层次创新上进行合理的生产资料分配。方法:结合政策文件与相关信息,建立博弈矩阵,对联采办与中标企业的利益诉求进行博弈分析。结果:联采办对中标企业高层次药品研发的支持力度越大,中标企业加大高层次创新投入的概率越高;中标企业的药品供应收益与高层次创新收益之间的差距越大,联采办鼓励高层次创新并控制超额供应规模的概率越高;中标企业加大药品供应投入的风险越大,联采办鼓励超额供应的概率越高。中标企业加大高层次药品研发投入的风险越大,联采办鼓励高层次药品创新的概率越高。结论:目前中标企业的成本投入侧重于仿制药供应,联采办可联合相关部门将鼓励高层次药品研发的政策与控制超额供应规模的政策相结合,从而更好地引导中标企业进行生产资料投入的分配。
Objective:This paper discussed the interest game between the Allied Purchase Office and the bid-winning enterprises about excess supply,and explored the optimization strategies for encouraging the latter to increase high-level R&D investment,especially how to guide the bid-winning enterprises to make a reasonable distribution of production materials in terms of excess supply and related innovation.Methods:Combined with policy documents and related information,the game matrix was established to conduct game analysis on the interests of the Allied Purchase Office and the bid-winning enterprises.Results:The greater the support of the Allied Purchase Office for the high-level R&D of the bid-winning enterprises,the higher probability they increase high-level R&D investment.And the bigger the gap between the drug supply income and the high-level innovation income of the bid-winning enterprises,the higher probability the Allied Purchase Office encourages R&D and limit excess supply.Also,the greater the risk of bid-winning enterprises'increase of investment in drug supply,the higher probability the Allied Purchase Office encourages excess supply.The greater the risk of bid-winning enterprises'increases of investment in high-level drug R&D,the higher the probability the Allied Purchase Office encourages high-level drug innovation.Conclusion:At present,the cost input of the bid-winning enterprises is focused on the supply of generic drugs,so the Allied Purchase Office should cooperate with relevant departments and combine the policies of encouraging high-level drug innovation with the ones of controlling the scale of excess supply to better guide the bid-winning enterprises to allocate the input of production materials.
作者
谭清立
王昊阳
TAN Qingli(School of Medical Business,Guangdong Pharmaceutical University,Zhongshan,Guangdong,528400,China)
出处
《医学与社会》
北大核心
2021年第8期129-134,共6页
Medicine and Society
基金
广东省软科学基金面上项目,编号为2019A101002068
广州市哲学社会科学“十四五”规划2021年度共建课题,编号为2021GZGJ313
广东省科技创新战略专项资金资助项目,编号为pdjh2020b0313。
关键词
带量采购
博弈矩阵
超额供应
Volume-based Purchasing
Game Matrix
Excess Supply