摘要
概念法学自诩建构了一个无漏洞的封闭体系,其代表人物普赫塔认为从法律概念出发可以自然而然地推导出法律规则,并且,就算在疑难案件中不存在能够与事实直接涵摄的法律规则,也能通过对法律概念的逻辑演绎解决无规则对应的情形。埃利希与康特洛维茨主导的自由法运动则坚决反对概念法学的主张,并认为制定法无处不存在漏洞,在制定法之外还存在自由法,而自由法才是法官裁判的依据。利益法学同样批判了概念法学的形式主义,其代表人物赫克明确表示概念法学的建构主义是一种“颠倒程序”,同时,还否定了自由法学的极端情形,主张通过利益衡量的方法来填补法律漏洞。也正是从利益法学开始,法律漏洞填补理论真正走向成熟。
Conceptual jurisprudence prides itself on constructing a closed system without loopholes.Puchta be⁃lieves that legal rules can be derived naturally from legal concepts,and even in hard cases,there are no legal rules that can be directly substantiated by facts,can also solve the situation of irregular correspondence through the logical deduction of legal concepts.The free law movement led by Ehrlich and Kontrowitz firmly opposed the idea of concep⁃tual jurisprudence,and believed that there are loopholes in statutory law everywhere,and there is free law in addi⁃tion to statutory law,only free law is judged by judges.Interest jurisprudence also criticized the formalism of concep⁃tual jurisprudence.Its representative,Heck,clearly stated that the constructivism of conceptual jurisprudence is a kind of“reversal procedure”.It is also from the beginning of interest law that the theory of filling legal loopholes has truly matured.
出处
《南海法学》
2021年第3期33-43,共11页
The South China Sea Law Journal
关键词
漏洞填补
概念法学
自由法运动
利益法学
Legal loopholes filling
Conceptual jurisprudence
Free law movement
interest jurisprudence
