嵌入多层政治制度结构的政党竞争——对台湾地区立法否决政治的一项制度分析

Party Competition Embedded in the Multilayered Structure of Political System:An Institutional Analysis of Taiwan's Legislative Veto Politics

台湾地区行政-立法运作中的否决政治不仅影响其内部政策过程,也牵制两岸未来和平统一的政治整合进程。本文试图对台湾地区立法否决政治中的制度组合及其对行政-立法机构及主要党派行动者的影响进行分析。台湾地区的“双首长制”虽然具有行政权二元、行政-立法二分、行政向议会(“立法院”)负责的制度架构,但该权力体制下的行政-立法关系自身具有否决体制特性。在多数决选举制度所牵引的政党极化竞争作用下,主要政党在既有否决结构中实施立法否决。除了“分立/少数政府”下的不同政党阵营容易出现立法否决外,“一致/多数政府”下执政党在未处理好立法领域的党政关系时也会出现立法否决问题。

The veto politics in the administrative legislation operation in Taiwan not only affects its internal policy process,but also hinders the future process of political integration of peaceful reunification across the Taiwan Strait.This paper attempts to make a detailed analysis of the institutional combination in Taiwan's legislative veto politics and its impact on the administrative-legislative body and the main party actors.Although the“double head system”in Taiwan has the system structure of dual administrative power,administrative-legislative dichotomy and administrative responsibility to Parliament(the legislative court),the administrative-legislative relationship under the government system has its characteristics of veto system.Under the polarized competition of political parties led by the majority election system,the main political parties implement legislative veto in the existing veto structure.In addition to the fact that different political parties under separate/minority governments are prone to imposing a legislative veto,the ruling party under the unanimous/majority government will also exercise a legislative veto when they fail to deal with the relationship between the party and the government at the legislative end.