考虑无缺陷退货下零售商转运的供应链回购契约研究

Research on Buyback Contract of Supply Chain with Retailer Transshipment Considering False Failure Returns

针对由单个供应商和同一连锁企业的两个零售商组成的供应链系统中无缺陷退货问题。在随机需求下,假设零售商努力水平与无缺陷退货率成反比,以及两个零售商之间可以相互进行库存转运,建立了期望收益决策模型。通过比较集中决策和分散决策下零售商订货量及各方期望利润,确定了零售商最优订货量和最优努力水平,并提出了改进的差异化回购契约,算例分析表明,改进的差异化回购契约能够达到供应链协调。

With the increasing social competition,False Failure Returns policies are often adopted by retailers to increase market sales of products.The possibility of inventory transshipment among retailers was not considered in previous studies on supply chain coordination with False Failure Returns.But in reality,retailer inventory transfer strategy is often used in supply chain as a powerful coordination mechanism.In this paper,the retailer’s transshipment strategy is introduced into the supply chain with False Failure Returns.Considering the effect of retailer’s effort level on consumers’false failure returns rate,the supply chain coordination mechanism based on improved differentiated buy-back contract is studied.Focusing on False Failure Returns in a supply chain system composed of one supplier and the chain retail enterprises with two retailers.In random demand,assuming retail’s effort levels are inversely proportional to false failure return rate and retailer transshipment are considered.A expected return model is presented to describe this problem.By comparing the order quantities of retails of centralized decision making system and distributed system,as well as the profits of the parties to make sure retailer’s optimal quantities and effort levels.Improved differentiated buyback contract is proposed.Finally,Analysis of examples show that improved differentiated buyback contract can achieve supply chain coordination when parameters satisfy 74.06≤λ≤94.53,81.93≤w≤94.02.The research results of this paper can provide a reference for the supply chain coordination with False Failure Returns and income improvement between both sides of supply chain.