强制性企业社会责任报告与审计收费:一项准自然实验

Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Report and Audit Fee:Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

本文利用企业社会责任报告强制披露政策出台这一契机,采用倾向匹配得分和双重差分模型的方法,系统考察了社会责任报告对审计收费的影响。研究发现:(1)被审计企业发布社会责任报告后,审计师降低了审计收费;(2)发布社会责任报告会使企业抑制盈余管理,相应减少了事务所的审计风险和审计投入,进而削减了审计收费;(3)审计师因企业发布社会责任报告而调低审计收费的现象主要存在于社会责任报告质量高以及外部监管严格和内部声誉动机强烈的企业中。本文不仅丰富了与审计收费影响因素相关的文献;同时,通过探索我国强制性社会责任报告的经济后果,对进一步完善强制披露政策也具有一定的借鉴意义。

Based on the mandatory disclosure background,this paper investigates how the audit fee responses to Corporate Social Responsibility(CSR)reports,using a propensity score matching and Difference-in-Differences(PSM-DID)model.We find that:(1)the auditor reduces audit price as a response to clients’issue of CSR reports;(2)the disclosure of CSR reports reduces audit pricing by inhibiting earnings management,which leads to a decrease in audit effort and audit risk;(3)the above effect is more pronounced in CSR reports with superior disclosure quality,and firms with stricter external monitors or stronger motivations to build reputation.Our findings not only enrich the literature related to audit fee,but also have important implications for further mandatory disclosure policies improvement.