数字平台捆绑销售策略的垄断动机研究:基于交叉网络外部性视角

A Study of the Motive Behind Digital Platform Bundling Strategy:Based on the Perspective of Cross-group Networks Externalities

交叉网络外部性提高了用户的交互价值,而捆绑销售则将这种外部性拓展到更多产品上,使得数字平台能够更有效地提升垄断势力、排斥竞争对手。为了明确数字平台捆绑销售策略的垄断动机及其反垄断涵义,本文构建动态博弈模型分别从纯捆绑和混合捆绑出发,考察了交叉网络外部性影响数字平台捆绑销售策略的作用机制。研究表明,平台两侧交叉网络外部性的强度决定了捆绑销售的类型:当交叉网络外部性较弱时,用户对数字平台的依赖程度较低,数字平台倾向于采取混合捆绑策略来获取更多消费者剩余;反之,数字平台将采取纯捆绑销售策略以阻止潜在进入者。该结论揭示了数字平台捆绑销售"屡禁不止"的原因,即交叉网络外部性使得数字平台能够在攫取消费者剩余和排斥潜在竞争对手之间进行权衡,从而更有效地维持垄断地位。然而,这却降低了消费者剩余和社会福利,应当引起反垄断部门的关注。据此,本文从商业模式、捆绑动因、监管路径和法规体系四个层面提出了政策建议。

Cross-Group Networks Externalities make users’interaction more valuable.Digital platforms,however,tend to extend them to more products than proper in their bundling so as to become more monopolistic and exclude other competitors from the market.To lay bare platforms’motive behind their bundling strategy and to facilitate anti-monopoly,the paper attempts to build a dynamic game model,and,starting from pure bundling and mixed bundling,studies mechanism about how cross-group networks externalities influence platforms’bundling strategy.The study shows that the strength of cross-group networks externalities determines the types of bundling strategy to be employed:Mixed bundling strategy is more preferable for digital platforms to extract more consumer surplus when weak externalities make users less dependent on them while pure bundling strategy is chosen by digital platforms to stop other possible competitors when externalities are strong.The reason why bundling prevails even if it is forbidden constantly is that externalities make it possible for digital platforms to sustain their favorable positions by making a choice between getting consumer surplus and excluding competitors.This deserves attention from anti-monopoly departments as it reduces consumer surplus and social welfare.In view of this,the paper attempts to put forward some suggestions from the perspectives of business model,bundling motive,inspection routes and law system.