社区养老服务中社工机构与政府的演化博弈

On Evolutionary Game between Social Service Agencies and Governments in Community-Based Elderly Care Services

社工机构提供社区养老服务的过程中存在社工机构与政府的演化博弈行为,对双方的博弈行为进行动态演化模型分析,结果显示:社工机构运营成本、政府奖惩政策、政府监督成本以及社工机构名誉度变化对演化稳定策略存在影响。不同情境下,政府与社工机构存在3种演化稳定策略。降低运营成本有助于社工机构积极提供优质养老服务,制定合理的奖惩政策可以使政府降低制定监督政策的成本,社工机构名誉度的变化影响博弈的稳定策略。分析结果对政府和社工机构均具有参考价值。

By analyzing the dynamic evolutionary game between social service agencies and governments in community-based elderly care services,it was found that the evolutionarily stable strategy would be influenced by operating costs of social service agencies,governments’policies regarding punishment and reward,governments’supervision costs,and changes in the reputation of social service agencies.In different situations,there are three types of evolutionarily stable strategy between the two parties.Reducing operating costs makes a helpful contribution to the quality elderly care services of the social service agencies.Reasonable policies of punishment and reward helps to lower the costs that the governments spend on supervision policies.The changes in the reputation of social service agencies have an impact on the stable strategy of the game.The results of the above analysis are of reference value to both parties.