污染排放控制下港航企业合作减排策略研究

Cooperation strategy of port and shipping company under emission control

针对污染排放控制下港口与航运公司合作减排问题,构建由单个港口与航运公司组成的两级海运供应链,建立港口主导的斯坦伯格博弈、港航纵向整合决策、港航合作纳什讨价还价决策以及港航协作节能减排决策四种决策模型,分析港口价格、减排水平、航运公司货运量以及双方利润的变化.结果表明:港航纵向整合决策下的双方利润均大于港口主导的斯坦伯格博弈;港航收益共享契约无法实现海运供应链协调;减排成本分担契约可以提高海运供应链整体效率,实现整体帕累托改进;港口倾向于减排成本分担决策,航运公司倾向于纳什讨价还价决策,由于后者在整体利润及节能减排水平均高于前者,因而需要政府激励推动港口接纳港航合作纳什讨价还价决策.

This study constructs a two-level maritime supply chain consisting of a single port and shipping company in view of their cooperation under the emission control.Four decision-making models were established,namely,port-led Stackelberg game,maritime vertical integration model,maritime Nash bargaining game and maritime coordination model;moreover,port price,abatement level,shipping companies'freight volume,and both parties'profits were examined.Results show that the profits of the port and shipping company under their vertical integration decision are greater than those under the port-led Stackelberg game.Moreover,revenue sharing contract cannot achieve the coordination of the maritime supply chain,whereas emission reduction cost sharing contract can improve the overall efficiency of the maritime supply chain and realize the overall Pareto improvement.Futhermore,port tends to make emission reduction cost-sharing decisions,whereas shipping companies tend to join the Nash bargaining game.However,because the latter's overall profit and abatement level are higher than the former,the government should encourage the port to accept the maritime Nash bargaining game.