摘要
基于“高铁网+快递网”的高铁快递模式出现,为研究主导权对高铁快递供应链价格策略的影响,分别建立集中决策、中铁快运主导、传统快递企业主导、Nash均衡的Stackelberg博弈模型,得到4种模式下中铁快运和传统快递企业的最优价格及最大利润。研究表明,不同主导权结构下的最优直销价格保持不变,最优零售价格则在主导权分散时最高;协议运价受主导企业的价格管控;主导权的分散将导致供应链整体利润受损;主导权有利于主导企业获得更大利润。
Based on the mode of"high-speed rail network+express network",in order to study the influence of dominant power on the price strategy of high-speed rail express supply chain,the Stackelberg game models of centralized decision-making,China Railway Express dominant,traditional express enterprise dominant and Nash equilibrium are respectively established,and the optimal price and maximum profit under four models obtained.The research shows that the optimal direct selling price remains the same under different dominant structures,while the optimal retail price is the highest when it’s decentralized.The wholesale price is controlled by the dominant enterprise.Decentralization will lead to the loss of the overall profit.The dominant power is conducive to the leading enterprise to obtain much profit.
作者
陈佳媛
周刚
CHEN Jiayuan;ZHOU Gang(School of Management,Tianjin University,Tianjin 300072,China)
出处
《工业工程》
北大核心
2021年第4期168-176,共9页
Industrial Engineering Journal