实际性、能力与可知性悖论

Actuality,Capacity,and the Paradox of Knowability

对于可知性悖论,虽然文献中包含许多解决方法,但本文将集中讨论爱津顿在1985年以来提出的语意限制方式——加入实际性算子,以及法拉在2010年提出的解悖方案——将可知性概念视为一种能力。对于爱津顿的解悖方案,威廉姆森提出严厉的批评;他认为我们不应该诉诸可能世界的居民所具有的知识,来评断语句在实际世界中的真假值。为了回应威廉姆森的批评,法拉试图透过将可知性概念解读为一种能力来回应。不过,本文将论证,法拉的理论仍无法给予威廉姆森一个满意的回应,因为能力概念也不是一个清楚的概念。

Although there are different kinds of solutions to the paradox of knowability,we will focus on Edgington's and Fara's solutions.According to Edgington,we can block the contradiction by adding an actuality operator to the verificationist thesis,and,according to Fara,the concept of knowability is treated as the capacity to know.However,Edgington's solution is threatened by Williamson's criticism that it seems absurd to appeal to the inhabitants,knowledge in some possible world for determining whether some actually true proposition is known in the actual world.I will argue that,although Fara's solution is immune from Williamson's criticism,he will face a dilemma:his capacity-solution leads us to either nowhere or Williamson's revenge.