公司负债偏离程度对企业创新的影响——基于委托代理视角

Deviation of Corporate Debt Level and Corporate Innovation——Based on the Perspective of Principal-Agent

本文基于委托代理理论框架,探讨企业负债对创新活动的影响。研究结果表明,公司负债偏离程度对企业创新具有显著的抑制作用;在过度负债企业中,当经理人的管理防御能力较强时,负债偏离程度的提高对企业创新的抑制作用会被削弱;在负债不足企业中,当经理人的管理防御能力较强时,负债偏离程度的提高对企业创新的抑制作用更显著。进一步的研究表明:良好的公司治理环境能够有效缓解负债偏离程度对企业创新的不利影响;不同负债水平下,负债偏离程度对企业创新的影响具有不对称性,相对于负债不足而言,过度负债对企业创新的抑制作用更加显著。

Based on the perspective of principal-agent framework,our study provides evidence on the relationship between the level of debt and corporate innovation.We find that the deviation from target capital structure will hinder innovation.In overleveraged firms,the negative relationship between debt deviation and innovation will be weakened when managerial entrenchment is strong;in underleveraged firms,the negative relationship between debt deviation and innovation will be more significant when managerial entrenchment is strong.Our further findings are as follow:A higher quality of corporate governance can effectively mitigate the negative impact of debt deviation on corporate innovation;the impact of debt deviation on corporate innovation is asymmetric,compared with insufficient leverage,excessive leverage has a more significantly negative impact on corporate innovation.