资源下乡、行动者博弈与基层治理内卷化

Resources Going to Countryside,Actors’Game and Grassroots Governance Involution

随着国家对基层资源投入的加大,村庄出现精英俘获资源的治理内卷化问题。基于个案追踪,发现多元行动主体围绕下乡资源展开博弈,却难以跳脱内卷化困境。运用理性选择理论,找回普通村民与村庄精英的复杂博弈关系,挖掘行动者行为选择的心态及动机。研究揭示资源下乡与行动者行为选择相抵牾的四组深层机制:村庄精英缺乏荣誉等要素激励,偏好以权谋利,导致资源下乡带来的公共利益分配竞争机制挤压合作机制;亲族博弈反复纠缠削弱关系信任机制;村庄精英依托信息自由裁量权限,构建项目信息差序扩散机制;对村庄精英异化项目经营自由裁量权限的利己行为的弱约束机制。四组机制是资源下乡带来基层治理内卷化的内在根源。

The state has strengthened its investment of project resources in grassroots,however,there appear problems of involution of governance in villages——resources are captured by village elites.Based on the case process tracking,it is found that the multiple actors unfold game around the resources,which finally ends up in the dilemma of involution.Using rational choice theory,retrieve the responses of ordinary villagers and their complex games with village elites,and explore the mentality and motivations behind the behavioral choices of multiple actors.The study reveals the four deep-seated mechanisms that contradict the rational choice behavior of the actors and the resources going to the countryside.Village elites lack incentives such as honor and prefer to seek profit from power;distribution of public interests is particularly prone to competition squeeze cooperation;Family games are repeatedly entangled leads to weakened relationship trust;Relying on the discretionary power of information,the village elites spread project information sequentially to construct their interest circles;It′s hard to constitute a strong restriction on the self-interested behavior of the village elites’dissimilation project management discretionary authority.The above-mentioned four groups of mechanisms are the internal sources of involution of grassroots governance caused by the resources going to the countryside.