独立董事换届“未连任”与公司违规行为

Independent Directors“No-second-term”and Corporate Violations

与独董直接辞职现象相比,独立董事以换届未连任方式完成的更迭与我国传统"和为贵"的商业文化有关,因而成为我国制度和文化背景下独特的公司治理故事。本文实证考察独董换届"未连任"现象与公司违规行为之间的关系,以此揭示独董换届"未连任"现象可能传递公司治理存在问题的信号。本文的研究表明,与不存在独董未连任的对照组相比,存在独董换届未连任现象的公司在换届当年和后一年发生违规行为的可能性显著增加,控制可能的内生性问题后结论依然成立;独董未连任不是受到已披露违规的牵连,而是其发现公司可能有潜在违规行为时的主动选择;声誉机制在其中发挥主要作用,职业关注程度更高的独董,换届未连任所传递的公司违规信号更加强烈。

Instead of directly resigning,some independent directors prefer leaving the companies through not succeeding for the second term,which is related to the"harmony is important"business culture in China.It has become a unique corporate governance story in the context of China’s system and culture.This paper empirically studies the relationship between the phenomenon of"no-second-term"of independent directors and corporate violations,so as to reveal the signal of corporate governance problems.It shows that companies have more possibilities of regulation violations after the independent directors depart at the end of their first term.The finding still stands after controlling the possible endogenous problems.So the independent directors without the second term voluntarily left when they found that the company might have potential violations.The phenomenon is particularly evident for the independent directors who pay more attention to their reputation.