控制权防御是企业创新的“绊脚石”吗?

Will corporate defense hamper corporate innovation?

本研究聚焦于中国资本市场上公司控制权防御机制,从企业内部章程的角度实证研究了公司控制权防御对中国上市公司创新的影响及作用机理.实证结果表明,公司控制权防御主要通过管理者堑壕假说影响企业创新,发挥了“绊脚石”的作用.接下来,从剩余控制权与剩余索取权相对应的原则出发,研究了公司控制权防御影响企业创新背后更深层次的理论逻辑.研究发现当剩余控制权与剩余索取权失衡时,健全企业监督机制可缓解控制权防御对企业创新的负面影响.从公司控制权防御角度研究企业创新问题,丰富了“法与金融”的文献,为控制权防御影响公司治理相关研究提供了新的理论解释,引发中国企业关于特殊公司治理机制设置的反思.

This paper focuses on the mechanism of corporate defense in China?s capital market,and empirically studies the impact and mechanism of corporate defense on the innovation of listed companies in China from the perspective of internal regulations.The paper finds that corporate defense mainly affects enterprise innovation through the entrenchment hypothesis and plays a“stumble”role.Next,starting from the principle that the residual claim right and the residual control right correspond,deeper theoretical logic behind the influence of corporate defense on corporate innovation is studied.The study shows that when the residual claim right and the residual control right are out of balance,a sound corporate supervision mechanism can alleviate the negative impact of control defense on corporate innovation.This paper studies the topic of firm innovation from the perspective of corporate defense,which contributes to literature regarding’law and finance’,and provides a new theoretical explanation for the relevant research on the influence of control defense on corporate governance,while initiating reflections on the establishment of special corporate governance mechanism.