商誉、信息不对称与企业避税

Goodwill, Information Asymmetry and Corporate Tax Avoidance

本文以2014―2019年A股上市公司为样本,探讨了商誉及商誉减值对企业避税的影响。研究发现,商誉对企业避税程度呈显著正向影响,即商誉金额越高,企业避税程度越大,而商誉减值能够抑制企业避税。机制检验结果表明,这是由于商誉在产生和后续处理中的自由裁量权积累了大量的信息不对称,为企业避税提供了机会;而计提商誉减值能够缓解其中的信息不对称,从而对避税有负向影响。进一步研究还发现,商誉对避税的影响只在信息不透明企业、非国企中存在,高质量审计、分析师关注都没有能够抑制商誉对避税的影响。本文丰富了商誉领域的相关研究,研究结论对相关监管机构具有一定参考价值。

Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2019,this paper empirically studies the relationship between goodwill,goodwill impairment and corporate tax avoidance.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the amount of goodwill and tax avoidance,that is,the higher the amount of goodwill,the greater the degree of corporate tax avoidance.We also find that goodwill impairment can inhibit tax avoidance.The mechanism test result shows that the discretion in recognition,measurement and subsequent processing of goodwill brings about a high level of information asymmetry,which provides opportunities for corporate tax avoidance.Further research shows that goodwill impairment can release the information asymmetry,which leads to a negative impact on corporate tax avoidance.Further,we find that the impact of goodwill on tax avoidance only exists in firms with opaque information and non-state-owned enterprises;high quality audit and analysts’attention cannot restrain the impact of goodwill on tax avoidance.This paper enriches the research in the field of goodwill,and has a certain reference value for the relevant regulators.