摘要
为了应对公司财务困境问题,在兼顾股东与债权人利益的基础上,采用激励相容理论,构建了基于权益再融资和策略性债务支付的公司定价模型,厘清了权益再融资、债务重组、财务困境及其伴生的再谈判之间的关系,据此提出了一种公司财务困境纾解方案。特别地,给出了策略性债务支付下进行权益再融资的可行性依据,并辅以再谈判手段及股东、债权人双方利益最大化目标,确定了最优重组边界及最优减记息票。分析结果表明:①将策略性债务支付置于财务困境之后、兼容权益再融资的综合方案,可在一定程度上避免策略性债务支付行为的投机性所导致的对公司定价的高估,产生了在一定条件下增加债务价值、放缓信用价差增长速度的效果;②权益再融资成本与信用价差之间呈现倒U型关系;③基于纳什均衡博弈的策略性债务支付减记息票不受流动性及权益再融资的影响,并可保证其处于公司的支付能力之内。
The company will default and get into financial distress if it cannot pay the coupon and principal due to illiquidity.After default,bankruptcy liquidation is not the only way out,and the company can revive through debt restructuring.Strategic debt service,which means the temporary payment of reduced coupon,is one of the important debt restructuring methods adopted by shareholders and creditors.In addition,the company also uses equity refinancing to solve financial distress.This paper clarifies the relationship between company’s financial distress and strategic debt service,making strategic debt service an incentive compatible tool with the characteristics of revenue-sharing and risk-sharing to alleviate company’s financial distress while effectively protecting the interests of creditors.It gives a comprehensive scheme which combines equity refinancing with strategic debt service to alleviate the company’s financial distress,and offers the implementation sequence of concerned tactics.The appropriate boundary conditions of company coupon payment,debt renegotiation,equity refinancing and strategic debt service are described.The influencing factors of pricing and credit spread are analyzed.Besides,the feasibility basis of equity refinancing under strategic debt service is given,and the optimal debt restructuring boundary and the optimal reduced coupon are determined by means of renegotiation based on maximizing the interests of both shareholders and creditors.The study finds that based on incentive compatibility theory,the approach of taking strategic debt service after company’s financial distress with equity refinancing will avoid the over-pricing of the company caused by the speculative behavior of strategic debt service to a certain extent,reduce the default boundary and generally increase the value of the debt and slow down the growth of credit spreads to some extent.Besides,there is an inverted u-shaped relationship between equity refinancing costs and credit spreads.Moreover,the strategic debt payment is not affected by liquidity and equity refinancing,and generally can be guaranteed within the firm’s payment ability based on the Nash equilibrium game model.
作者
谭春萍
秦学志
王文华
王麟
TAN Chun-ping;QIN Xue-zhi;WANG Wen-hua;WANG Lin(School of economics and management, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China;Plan and Financial Department, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian 116029, China)
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSSCI
CSCD
北大核心
2021年第8期181-189,共9页
Operations Research and Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871040,71471026)
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71731003)
国家社科基金重大项目(18ZDA095)
辽宁省“兴辽英才计划”哲学社会科学领军人才项目(XLYC1804005)。
关键词
策略性债务支付
权益再融资
博弈能力
公司定价
激励相容
strategic debt service
equity refinancing
bargaining power
company pricing
incentive compatibility