飞检模式下工程质量监管四方演化博弈研究

Four-Party Evolutionary Game of Engineering Quality Supervision Under Unannounced Inspection Mode

针对工程质量监管体系中引入飞检模式的实际情况,研究包含飞检组织的工程质量监管体系内在运行机理。基于演化博弈理论,构建飞检组织、常规质量监督机构、监理单位、施工单位等四方演化博弈糢型,通过建立支付矩阵并求解复制动态方程,得到16个均衡点,并分析讨论了均衡点博弈策略的稳定性。基于数值仿真分析了抽查概率、抽查成本、处罚、声誉等因素对各主体博弈策略演化的影响规律,可为完善飞检模式下的工程质量监管体系提供参考。

In view of the actual situation of introducing the unannounced inspection mode into the engineering quality supervision system,this paper studies the internal operation mechanism of the engineering quality supervision system involving unannounced inspection units.Based on the evolutionary game theory,an evolutionary game model of four-party including unannounced inspection unit,conventional quality supervision organization,supervision unit and construction unit is proposed.The 16 equilibrium points were obtained by establishing the payment matrix and solving the replication dynamic equation.And the stability of the equilibrium of game strategy was analyzed and discussed.Then*the influence of the factors such as the spot-check probability,the cost,the penalty,and the reputation on the evolution of each player’s game strategy were discussed through numerical simulation analysis.The conclusions can provide references for improving the engineering quality supervision system under the mode of unannounced inspection.