两个异构签密方案的分析

Analysis of two Heterogeneous Signcryption Schemes

为了更好地探究异构签密方案的安全性,对两个异构签密方案进行了密码学分析,使用替换发送者的方法对第一个方案进行了保密性攻击,使用替换接收者的方法对第二个方案进行了伪造性攻击。本文通过对第一个方案的攻击,演示了一个恶意的发送者可以与某个第三方合谋来破坏方案的保密性;通过对第二个方案的攻击,演示了一个恶意的接收者可以与某个第三方合谋来破坏方案的不可伪造性。这两种攻击表明两个方案都是不安全的,难以运用在实际的环境中。

To further explore the security of heterogeneous signcryption schemes,two heterogeneous signcryption schemes are analyzed in cryptography.The first scheme is attacked by replacing the sender for breaking the confidentiality,and the second one is attacked by replacing the receiver for forgeability.Through the attack of scheme one,this paper shows that a malicious sender can collude with any third party to break the confidentiality of the scheme;through the attack of scheme two,this paper shows that a malicious receiver can collude with any third party to break the unforgeability of the scheme.These attacks show that both of the schemes are insecure to be applied in the real environment.