村集体组织介入下农地征收补偿冲突的演化博弈:互动公平偏好视角

Trilateral Evolutionary Game Research in Farmland Expropriation Compensation:Interactive Justice Preference Perspective

农地征收补偿冲突是影响我国农村经济发展和基层治理的重要问题,村集体组织在整个过程中扮演重要的角色,其介入方式的不同会导致征收补偿进程朝着不同的方向发展.考虑村集体组织介入农地征收补偿的情形,构建互动公平偏好视角下的农地征收补偿冲突演化博弈模型,通过策略分析和数值分析研究关联主体在偏好影响下的策略选择,并且将不同的博弈均衡结果对应村集体组织的有效介入(正面介入或负面介入)和无效介入.研究发现,村集体组织在农地征收补偿中有其局限性.缺乏互动公平偏好的村集体组织甚至负面介入征收补偿,从而加剧征收主体之间的冲突.

Farmland expropriation compensation is an important issue affecting rural economic development and grass-roots governance in China.Village collective organizations play an important role in the whole process,and their different decisions will lead to the development of expropriation compensation process in different directions.In this paper,considering the village collective organizations involved in the case of expropriation compensation,build the interactive fair preference under the perspective of evolutionary game model,expropriation compensation conflict to stable strategy to solve the model,through the strategy analysis and numerical analysis relevance strategy choice under the influence of the main body in the preferences,and will be a different game results corresponding to the village collective organization of effective intervention(positive intervention or negative) and invalid.It is found that village collective organization has its limitations in farmland expropriation compensation.Village collective organizations lacking interactive fairness preference even intervene in expropriation compensation negatively,thus exacerbating the conflict between expropriation subjects and violating the original intention of village collective organizations.Finally,according to the above research results,some Suggestions are put forward to resolve the conflict of farmland expropriation compensation.