从非本真到本真的生活世界

From Inauthentic to Authentic Life-World

本文试图通过批判各种非本真的世界理解,获得本真的生活世界概念。我们将首先考察胡塞尔如何通过引入生活世界概念对唯科学主义进行批判,并用生活世界为科学提供基础。其次,我们将驳斥把生活世界等同于生命哲学、实证主义这类世界观哲学的错误倾向,并表明生活世界在引导我们进入现象学态度上的“道路”作用。再次,我们也将反对把生活世界概念“观念化”“图像化”的任何做法,它们会造成生活世界概念的含混与矛盾。只有基于在现象学态度下将生活世界理解为先验的普遍视域,我们才能得到一个融贯的生活世界概念。最后,我们将探讨自然态度和现象学态度的紧张关系,在更高的层面将生活世界刻画为一种在现象学反思下不断突破自身边界、并向新的形态无限开放的可能性视域。通过展示从非本真到本真的生活世界的“谱系”,我们希望最大程度地呈现这一概念的极端复杂性。从这里敞开的可能性出发,我们才能再一次突破我们认识世界的边界。

In this paper,I attempt to criticize some inauthentic understandings of world,and get the authentic concept of life-world.In the beginning,I examine how Husserl criticizes radical scientism by introducing the concept of life-world,and how he lays a ground for science.Then,I refuse the wrong position of regarding life-world theory as some kind of world view philosophy like life philosophy or positivism,and argue that the concept of life-workl functions rather as a way which leads us to phenomenological attitude.Moreover,I also oppose any tendency of“idealizing”and“pictorializing”the concept of life-world,which makes it confusing and full of contradictions.Only when we understand life-world as a universal transcendental horizon in phenomenological attitude,can we acquire a coherent concept of life-workl.Finally,I analyze the tension between natural attitude and phenomenological attitude,and determine life-workl as a horizon of possibilities which constantly breaks its own boundaries and infinitely opens towards a new outlook.By revealing a“genealogy”from inauthentic to authentic life-world,I hope to show the extreme complexity of this concept.From this perspective,we could transcend the limitation of our world understanding once again.