生命现象学视域下的情感元伦理学何以可能——从意向性感受伦理学到生命自行感受伦理学

The Possibility of a Metaethics of Sentiment in the Horizon of the Phenomenology of Life: From the Life Ethics of Intentional Affection to the Ethics of Auto-affection

对价值情感构造方式的不同理解构成了胡塞尔与舍勒现象学伦理学的重要差异,但二者都是在意向性的框架下讨论价值情感的先天构造能力。亨利认为,意向性结构无法澄清质料价值伦理学自身的奠基性问题,解决这一问题需要探究更为原初的显现的本质。作为原初显现的本质,生命的自行感受是一种以内在性为根本特征的非意向的自行显现,它构成了意向性超越得以可能的条件。生命的本真存在方式表现为一种以自行感受的方式自行显现的生命情感,生命情感的自行感受与价值存在着一种先天的本质关联。在此意义上,生命的自行感受性具备为情感质料伦理学进行先天奠基的可能性。

Husserl’s and Scheler’s different comprehensions of the constitutive form of the value of feeling lead to the important difference in their phenomenological ethics. Nevertheless,both of them discuss the a priori constitutive ability of the value of feeling in an intentional structure. Henry holds that the intentional structure is unable to clarify how the material ethics of value realizes its self-foundation,and that it is the more original manifestation that needs to be investigated. Life’s auto-affection,as the manifestation of essence whose radical character is immanence, is a kind of non-intentional auto-manifestation that constitutes the condition of possibility of the intentional transcendence. The authentic existence of life is represented as a kind of life feeling that auto-manifests in the form of auto-affection,and it exists in an a priori relationship between auto-affection of life feeling and its value. In this sense,the auto-affectivity of life has the possibility to establish an a priori foundation for the material ethics of value.