国有资本投资运营公司改革试点效果评估——基于企业绩效的视角

Performance Evaluation of the Pilot Program of the Reform of State-owned Capital Investment and Operation Companies:Based on the Perspective of Corporate Performance

有效推进国有企业改革对于全面深化改革具有非常重要的意义,本文以国有资本投资运营公司改革试点为背景,从企业绩效的视角对改革试点的运行效果进行评估。本文研究发现,母公司进行国有资本投资运营公司试点将显著提升其所属上市公司的会计绩效和市场绩效,该结论在进行一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。进一步机制检验发现,国有资本投资运营公司改革试点主要通过放权机制(降低政府干预)、监督机制(降低代理成本)和激励机制(增加外部薪酬差距)影响企业绩效。本文研究对新时代背景下继续扩大和完善国有资本投资运营公司试点工作提供理论支撑和政策指引,也为进一步深化国企改革,打造世界一流企业,进而实现国有经济乃至国民经济高质量发展提供参考。

In the new stage of deepening reform of state-owned enterprises,the government proposed to restructure or establish state-owned capital investment and operation companies in order to further strengthen the supervision of state-owned assets and to reform the system of authorized operation of state capital with a focus on capital management.Both the theoretical and the practical are eager to know whether this reform has played a substantive role and achieved the objectives of the polit reform.However,the research on the effectiveness of polit reform is still in the stage of theoretical discussion,and there is still a lack of empirical research to evaluate it comprehensively and systematically.This paper attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of the pilot program of the reform of state-owned capital investment and operation companies from the perspective of corporate performance.Using the sample of state-owned listed companies in China from 2012 to 2019,this paper examines the impact of the pilot program of the reform of state-owned capital investment and operation companies on corporate performance and its mechanism by employing difference-in-differences design.The empirical results show that the pilot program of the reform of state-owned capital operating companies can significantly improve the accounting and market performance of the state-owned listed companies under its control.This conclusion is still robust after a series of tests.Further mechanism tests show that the pilot reform mainly affects corporate performance through decentralization mechanism(reducing government intervention),supervision mechanism(reducing agency costs),and incentive mechanism(increasing external pay gap).The conclusions of this paper not only provide theoretical evidence support for the expansion and improvement of the pilot program of the reform of state-owned capital investment and operation companies in the new era,but also provide implications for further deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises and promoting quality economic development.This paper may have the following two theoretical contributions:First,quantitative evaluation of social and economic policies is of great significance to the further implementation of policies.Evaluating the effects,efficiency,and benefits of economic policies in a quantitative way helps to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and make scientific decisions.This study evaluates the effectiveness of the polit reform from the perspective of corporate performance,and provides theoretical evidence support for the expansion and improvement of the pilot reform.Second,this paper explores the potential mechanisms of the pilot reform on corporate performance,which helps us better understand the influence of the pilot reform.Our empirical results show that the pilot reform mainly affects corporate performance through decentralization mechanism(reducing government intervention),supervision mechanism(reducing agency costs),and incentive mechanism(increasing external pay gap).Those findings are not only an important supplement to the literature on the reform of state-owned enterprises,but also enrich the literature on government intervention,shareholder activism,and executive pay gaps.In addition,this paper also has important practical implications for deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises in China.Firstly,our conclusions reach a positive evaluation of the achievements of the pilot reform,and provide theoretical evidence for the further expansion and improvement of the pilot reform.Secondly,this paper provides policy implications for what role the government should play in the reform of state-owned enterprises,and how to make state-owned capital investment and operation companies play a greater role and better meet national strategic needs.The government should scientifically and reasonably define the boundary between the government and the market,and effectively reduce the government intervention,which will help the market-oriented mechanism play an important role in resource allocation.Thirdly,this paper provides guidance for state-owned enterprises on how to improve their performance.Our findings indicate that state-owned enterprises should focus on expanding the rights of autonomous operation,improving corporate governance,and optimizing the incentive system.