控股股东股权质押、投资者情绪与实体企业“脱实向虚”——基于迎合理论视角

Controlling Shareholder Equity Pledge, Investor Sentiment and the Financialization of Real Enterprises: Based on the Perspective of Catering Theory

实体经济中严重的"脱实向虚"现象引起了学术界和监管机构的广泛关注。本文借助迎合理论,以资本市场中的实体企业行为与投资者群体为微观影响因素切入点,深度剖析实体企业金融化的诱发因素及作用机制。以2010—2019年中国A股实体企业为样本,研究发现,在控股股东股权质押后,实体企业金融化趋势会显著增加;高涨的投资者情绪会促使实体企业采用金融化投资行为迎合资本市场;投资者情绪产生的迎合效应,是控股股东股权质押影响实体企业金融化的重要途径。进一步研究表明,控股股东在股权质押期间并不会基于蓄水池动机持有金融资产提升企业长期竞争力,而更多通过持有长期金融资产进行套利;配置长期金融资产是控股股东股权质押后,为了迎合高涨的投资者情绪的重要选择;在牛市中控股股东股权质押主要为了迎合投资者而增加金融化投资,在熊市中则是为了规避控制权转移风险。本文研究结论揭示了实体企业在控股股东股权质押与高涨的投资者情绪背景下的策略性金融投资行为,为相关监管机构强化对实体企业金融化的监管提供了理论依据和参考。

In recent years, financial investment has gradually become the main channel for entity companies to obtain investment profits.The high-yield, high-disposability, and information maneuverability attributes of financial investment have made financial investment widely sought after.With the gradual increase of financial investment by real enterprises, industrial investment has lost its main business position, and at the same time, it is also facing corresponding economic risks.Therefore, how to make real enterprises pay attention to the focus, from excessive financial investment(virtual economy) to industrial investment(real economy),is an important topic in the current academic circles.Especially when the financialization risks are gradually increasing and the economic system is facing major structural imbalances, it is particularly important to manage the inducing factors of the financialization of entities.Existing researches rely on the "reservoir" theory and "investment substitution" theory to extensively explore the motives of the financialization of entities, especially in terms of the macro environment.However, few studies have explored the inducing factors of the financialization of real enterprises from the perspective of micro-subjects in the capital market.As the phenomenon of financialization has become more prominent, more and more controlling shareholders of entity companies tend to use equity pledges to obtain funds.This brings opportunities for this article to study the financial decision-making of listed entities with controlling shareholders as the main actors.Although the pledged funds can support their short-term strategy, if they do not do well, the controlling shareholder will still face the risk of control transfer during the pledge period.According to the relevant regulations on pledge risk management in the regulations, if the principal ratio of the listed company’s share price falls below the liquidation line, the pledgee has the right to dispose of the pledged subject matter.As a result, listed companies not only need to pay attention to the liquidity reserves of assets held in the business process, but also pay attention to the chain reaction caused by the decline in stock prices to prevent the risk of transfer of control rights.Therefore, controlling shareholders have more incentives to influence the decision-making of the entity enterprise.So, will the pledge of controlling shareholders’ equity further induce the financialization of real enterprises? What is the motive? In addition, China is still in an emerging market.There is a limited arbitrage system and a large number of "retail" investors in the capital market.The influence of investor sentiment cannot be ignored.Furthermore, will financial investment decision-making become a powerful tool for entity companies to cater to investor sentiment in the capital market? Will investor sentiment induce financialization behavior in the management of entity companies?Taking China’s A-share entity companies from 2010 to 2019 as a sample, the study found that after the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge, the financialization trend of entity companies will increase significantly;high investor sentiment will prompt entity companies to adopt financial investment behaviors to cater to the capital market;The caterative effect of investor sentiment is an important way for controlling shareholders’ equity pledge to affect the financialization of real enterprises.Further research shows that the controlling shareholder will not hold financial assets based on the cistern motive to enhance the long-term competitiveness of the company during the equity pledge period, but more arbitrage through holding long-term financial assets;the allocation of long-term financial assets is the controlling shareholder’s equity After the pledge, it is an important choice in order to cater to the high investor sentiment.In a bull market, the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge is mainly to cater to investors and increase financial investment, and in a bear market, it is to avoid the risk of control transfer.The research conclusions of this paper reveal the strategic financial investment behaviors of entity enterprises under the background of controlling shareholder’s equity pledge and high investor sentiment, and provide theoretical basis and reference for relevant regulatory agencies to strengthen the supervision of entity enterprises’ financialization.