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提高TOR入口节点选择率的方法研究

Research on Methods to Improve the Selection Rate of TOR Entry Nodes
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摘要 TOR是世界上最受欢迎的匿名通信系统,也因此逐渐成为攻击和审查的目标。大量工作研究了TOR对于各类攻击的脆弱性,而攻击者一旦控制了通信链路入口节点,链路两端被观察的概率将大大提高,进而破坏通信双方的匿名性,对用户安全构成严重威胁。通过分析TOR路由选择算法,对受控恶意入口节点进行有效的分配部署来提高受控入口节点被选率。实验表明,当攻击总资源一定时,受控节点带宽设置在53.8 Mbit/s左右更易被用户选择。 TOR is the most popular anonymous communication system in the world,and as such has become an increasing target for at⁃tacks and censorship.A lot of work has studied the vulnerability of TOR to various kinds of attacks.Once the entry node of communica⁃tion circuit is controlled,the probability of the two ends of the circuit being observed by the attacker will be greatly increased,which will destroy the anonymity of both sides of the communication.By analyzing the Tor path selection algorithm,the controlled entry nodes are allocated and deployed effectively to improve the selection rate of controlled entry nodes.The experiment shows that when the total attack resources are constant,the bandwidth of controlled nodes is set at about 53.8Mbit/s,which is easier to be selected by TOR users.
作者 张瑾 Zhang Jin(School of Computer Science and Information Technology,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044)
出处 《现代计算机》 2021年第23期17-22,共6页 Modern Computer
关键词 匿名通信 TOR路由选择 Guard节点 入口节点 anonymous communication TOR routing guard node entry node
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